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 e changing geography of responsibilities 





In this article, the changing geography of care for the elderly in today’s society is 
mapped out in (1) its consequences for the meaning of “home” for frail elderly and 
(2) for the distribution of care responsibilities. Two current ideas that are criticized 
are that (1) home is always the best place to be (and therefore also the preferred place 
to receive care), and (2) that one has stronger ethical obligations to people who live in 
one’s neighbourhood, because of their proximity. Together with the so-called ethics of 
care, care is considered a fundamental societal practice, and the distribution of caring 
responsibilities a primary ethical question. Care responsibility, it is argued, is never a 
natural given, but must be negotiated in every situation and dierent context anew. In 
following moral philosopher Robert Goodin, the article concludes that responsibility 
in long-term relationships between frail parents and adult children not proximity is 
decisive for assigning responsibility, but the parents’ specic vulnerability.
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1. Introduction
In the last decades in the Netherlands, as in other former welfare states, the 
conviction became state policy that the elderly should live at their homes 
as long as possible, and, if dependent on care, should consider their adult 
children or neighbourhood responsible for delivering that care. e idea 
behind this policy is not only that “ageing in place” is more cost-eective, 
but also that old people prefer to live and receive care at home.
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is neoliberal policy leaves the idea behind – dominant in welfare states of 
the late 20th century, but also in non-western, and (post-) socialist societies – 
that taking care of the elderly is a public and collective responsibility.1
In this article, I want (1) to ask what the meaning of “home” is for frail 
elderly. Is home (still) for them the best place to be? I suppose that a 
romantic misunderstanding of “home” comes into play here. (2) I doubt 
whether adult children always have a rst responsibility for the care of their 
aged parents. Care responsibility, I will argue here, is never a natural given, 
but must be negotiated anew in every situation and dierent context. I will 
oer some arguments for a “deprivatization” – or: de-particularization – of 
care for the elderly people.
In answering these questions, I draw on two theoretical propositions: (1) 
Together with the so-called ethics of care, I consider care a fundamental 
societal practice, and distribution of caring responsibilities as the primary 
ethical question. Care should not be regarded as a commodity, subject to 
market mechanisms. Care is not a private activity in the margin of society, 
to be delegated in particular to women, but a collective responsibility.2 (2) 
With Margaret Urban Walker, I also consider morality as a social practice 
in which what is good and who is responsible for doing good – and when, 
where and to whom – is expressed in relationships, identities and values, 
and is assessed in ongoing dialogue and negotiations. ere is no such 
thing as pure moral knowledge obtained by pure reection. With Walker, 
I want to stay away from a juridical-theoretical understanding of ethics 
1 “[N]eoliberalism is predominantly associated with the ongoing shi from public to 
private ownership that began in the 1980s; the shi of risk from the state or government 
to the individual; the continuing attempt to downsize or privatize established social 
care; the changes in governmental support for health and well-being; the increasing 
income inequality; and, most signicantly, an increasing focus on the individual as 
the locus of social action and motive.’ (Robert L. Rubinstein and Kate de Medeiros, 
“Successful Aging,” Gerontological eory and Neoliberalism: A Qualitative Critique,” 
e Gerontologist 55, no. 1 (2015): 34–42, 36). Concerning post-socialist societies, cf. 
Christine Milligan, ere’s No Place Like Home: Place and Care in an Ageing Society 
(Farnham: Ashgate, 2009), 55: “Within countries formerly part of the Soviet Republic, 
the historical legacy of collective responsibility meant that until relatively recently, 
(basic) long-term care for frail and vulnerable groups was provided within state-run 
institutional settings.”
2 Cf. Joan Tronto, Moral Boundaries. A political argument for an ethic of care (New York: 
Routledge, 1993) and idem, Caring democracy. Markets, equality and justice (New York: 
New York University Press, 2013).
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and defend – what she calls an expressive-collaborative concept of ethics. 
In that approach, responsibility is a dialogical practice, not an ethical 
principle.3
e two current ideas that I want to criticize in this paper are that (1) home 
is always the best place to be (and therefore also the preferred place to 
receive care), and (2) that one has stronger ethical obligations to people 
who live in one’s neighbourhood, because of their proximity.
My article is written mainly from the perspective of elderly people in 
current Dutch society, so it has a very limited, contextual scope. However, 
I think my reection on the meaning of “home”, and my approach to 
responsibility transcends that context and may inform other discourses as 
well. e group of frail seniors is expanding worldwide. Oen people in 
the West have a romanticized idea of the life older people lead in societies 
with a community-oriented ethics, lled with love and respect. However, 
reality oen proves otherwise. “Economically, older people experience 
diculty working in old age due to health problems. Only one in ve have 
access to pensions. In the HIV/Aids-ridden areas, older people are even 
more vulnerable. ey are oen le with grandchildren whose parents 
have died because of HIV/Aids or violent conicts. Without support, not 
only they, but also their grandchildren are facing serious problems.”4 Due 
to global urbanization processes, traditional, rural family and community 
structures rapidly erode and impede the elderly to rely on the support of 
their adult children and their families.
In my rst section, I shall sketch the changing landscape of care in present 
Dutch society. In the next one, I shall go into the question of what living at 
home means for frail, care-dependent elderly. In a nal section, I conclude 
with an ethical reection on responsibility in the context of care, and on 
the question what a fair distribution of responsibilities then means.
3 Margaret Urban Walker, Moral Understandings. A Feminist Study in Ethics (New York 
and London: Routledge, 1998).
4 Global aging is changing the world. World Granny report 2004–2016 http://www.
unightforgranny.nl/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Jaarverslag-2004–2016.pdf
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2. e changing landscape of care
e spatial metaphor of landscape is chosen deliberately. How people care 
for each other depends on where they live. Who cares for whom and how, 
depends on its where.5 is applies globally, nationally, and regionally, 
but also on a micro-level. Ageing is not an abstraction. Growing old in 
medieval times or in the 21st century, in the Netherlands or in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, in urban or in rural contexts, owning a house (big, small, old, new), 
having children, grandchildren around – determine whether and how you 
are being cared for. Where you live can kill you is the subtitle of a recent 
book of Clare Bambra, who is doing research on how health inequalities are 
inuenced by the place one lives. “Geography is a matter of life and death”, 
she writes.6 Where one lives, determines one’s socio-economic status and 
this, in turn, how old you will grow, and how. Bambra supplies convincing 
evidence that “the demographic (age, sex and ethnicity), health behaviour 
(smoking, alcohol, physical activity, diet, drugs) and socioeconomic 
(income, education, occupation) prole of the people within a community 
determines its health outcomes: poor people result in poor places.”7
e landscape of care is changing: For centuries, the elderly were taken care 
of in and by their physical neighbourhood, by their family living under 
the same roof, or next-door neighbours. Care was organized territorially. 
Physical proximity determined responsibility. In emerging economies 
without a pension system or institutionalized healthcare, children still 
count as old age provision.8 e two basic aspects of care, caring about, 
being attentive to someone’s needs, and caring for, the concrete activities 
5 For the “geography of care” as a sub discipline within geography, cf. Victoria Lawson, 
“Geographies of Care and Responsibility”. Annals of the Association of American 
Geographers 97, no. 1 (2007): 1–11.
6 Bambra is Professor of Public Health Geography in Newcastle, UK. Clare Bambra, 
Health Divides. Where You Live Can Kill You (Bristol: Policy Press, 2016), 23: ‘Place 
both creates and contains social, economic and political relations as well as physical 
resources. Spatial inequalities in health are therefore a result of a complex mix of 
economic, social, environmental and political processes – coming together in particular 
places. Places can be health-promoting (salutogenic) or health-damaging (pathogenic).’
7 Bambra, Health Divides, 97f.
8 Globally about 100 countries have some kind of pension system. In most lower and 
middle income nations however, there is none. Cf. “Watch. Protection in Old Age. 
HelpAge International”. [Online]. Available: http://www.pension-watch.net/ [Accessed: 
February 1, 2018].
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of meeting someone needs, then belong together and are in the hands and 
hearts of the same persons. Informal and formal care, community care and 
professional care are not dierentiated.9
With the revolutionary increase in the number of elderly and their life 
expectancy, combined with developments in medical technology, care for 
the old underwent an exponential expansion in both extent and complexity, 
which aects the geography of care in a fundamental way.10 Health care 
is in the process of being medicalized and technologized, and is at the 
same time becoming the object of commodication. Besides physical and 
territorial space, other spaces are created with their own dynamics of 
distance and proximity, strongly connected to processes of modernization 
and globalization.11 Communication technology and internet are 
creating global forms of proximity (for instance Face Timing with your 
grandchildren down under) and local distance (not knowing what happens 
two streets away in your neighbourhood). e physical place where you live 
is only one place among others, and not always the most important one.
is also aects the lifeworld of elderly and the content and organization 
of the way they are cared for. e so-called welfare state, as developed in 
9 Milligan, No Place like Home, 14.
10 e societal challenge of an aging population is not only a Northern hemisphere 
aair. e world population is rapidly getting older. is ‘demographic transition’ is 
driven by two factors: increased life expectancy and declining fertility rates. Already 
over sixty percent of the world’s aged population lives in developing countries, and this 
will increase to seventy-ve percent by 2025 and eighty-ve percent by 2050, according 
to the United Nations Population Division. e 80-plus age group makes up the fastest 
growing segment of the population; its share of the over-60 population will increase 
from twelve percent to nineteen percent by 2050.’ (Frits de Lange, “e Dignity of the 
Old: Towards a Global Ethic of Ageing”, International Journal of Public eology 3, no.2 
(2009): 203–220, 204).
11 Arjun Appadurai, Modernity at large: Cultural dimensions of Globalisation (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 1996) distinguishes in the globalization process, ve, 
for the largest part imagined worlds or symbolic spaces: ethnoscape, the physical world 
of travelers, tourists, refugees, migrants etc.; technoscape, the global conguration of 
technology, both mechanical and informational, nancescape, the ows of global; 
mediascape, the electronic (social) media; ideoscape, de circulation of ideals and 
ideologies, generating political power. (Quoted by Martin Hyde & Paul Higgs, Ageing 
and Globalisation (Bristol: Policy Press 2016), 38). Marc Augé introduced the distinction 
between space and place, as spaces respectively without and with meaning, arguing 
that globalization resulted in an increase of space as non-place (Marc Augé, Non-places. 
Introduction to an Anthropology of Supermodernity (London-New York: Verso, 1995).
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Western societies post-World War II, radically dissociated itself from the 
idea that care for the elderly should take place at home by the family. Elderly 
care became a state-governed, public responsibility in the form of elderly 
pensions and social security, covering – as was the case in the Netherlands 
with the so-called Algemene Wet Bijzondere Ziektekosten (AWBZ) – 
simultaneously the costs of housing, living and medical care. Care for the 
old and very old became institutionalized in a concrete physical place, 
the retirement or nursing home, where even the informal para- and non-
medical care was organized according to a medical code and regime.
Aer the welfare state collapsed and was replaced by neo-liberal policies, 
this model vanished. Since then, as it happened in the Netherlands, public 
retirement homes have been closed at a rapid pace. Access to a nursing 
home is reserved now only for those elderly who need intensive 24-hours 
care.12 ough there are relative dierences in their policy, all EU countries 
without exception are guided by the ideal of “successful” or “active ageing”, 
which expresses a neo-liberal political ideology: it implies three aspects. 
(1) Care is primarily a personal and private responsibility, to be organized 
by individuals within their own social network. e family therefore is 
the primary locus of care. (2) Formal care is regarded as a commodity, 
regulated by the market. When you need to be looked aer, you pay for it. 
(3) e state stimulates and mobilizes on both a national and local level the 
nancial independence and social self-reliance of its elderly citizens.13
is means that the focus in the geography of care is shiing again towards 
home and the proximate physical environment. So it seems that care is 
back again were it once began: aer a short period (a historical mistake?) of 
elderly care as a collective responsibility, it returns where nature seems to 
have meant it: at home, in the family.
is picture however, does not consider some important developments, 
essential for a fair distribution of responsibilities in the geography of care.
12 Cretien van Campen, Jurjen Iedema, Marjolein Broese van Groenou, Dorly Deeg, Langer 
Zelfstandig. Ouder worden met hulpbronnen, ondersteuning en zorg. (Den Haag: Sociaal 
en Cultureel Planbureau, 2017). e nursing home represents the end of the healthcare 
chain: the average stay until death in 2016 in a Dutch nursing home counted 430 days. 
(“Feiten en cijfers over de verpleeghuiszorg, Actiz 2016”. [Online]. Available: https://www.
actiz.nl/stream/160715-feiten-en-cijfers-verpleeghuiszorgdef.pdf [Accessed: 1 February 2018].
13 Virpi Timonen, Beyond Successful and Active Ageing. A eory of Model Ageing (Bristol: 
Policy Press, 2017).
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First: it neglects the demographic revolution, the fast double “graying” 
of society especially in developed countries, which rapidly increases the 
number of elderly within the total population (People aged over 60 will 
outnumber children aged 0–14 by 2050).14 Combined with a decline in 
natality and the fact that old people grow older than ever before, this 
revolution leads to an increase in the need of non-medical care, for which 
adult children are simply no longer statistically available.
Second: Advanced medical technology contributes to the longevity of frail 
elderly, who are dependent for their quality of life on specialized geriatric 
care. is means that old age is increasingly medicalized. Without a 
constant monitoring by professional expertise, surviving old age in a 
dignied way is unthinkable. A exible interplay of both informal and 
formal care is required for a satisfactory advanced age. Good informal care 
from family and neighbours depends on the availability of the formal care 
of professionals, and vice versa.15
e distinction between formal and informal care, therefore, becomes 
increasingly porous and articial. Family and neighbours are involved 
and brought in by professionals not only as a resource of care, but also 
as co-workers and proto-professionals. On the other hand, the moment 
professional care workers enter homes; they also develop aective and 
emotional bonds with their clients. Informal caregivers and professionals 
constantly negotiate “on the spot” how their forms of care relate to one 
another. One may conclude, with Christine Milligan, that the neo-liberal 
dislocation of care from public institutions towards home looks like a 
deinstitutionalizing of care, but in fact represents a movement the other 
way around: “an institutionalization of the home”.16
In neo-liberal public health policy’s emphasis on home as the place of care, 
the elder person’s self-management (also by calling in the help of one’s 
14 Cf. the global ageing statistics on HelpAge International’s website [Online]. Available: 
http://www.helpage.org/resources/ageing-data/global-ageing-statistics/.
15 Once involved, professionals sometimes completely take over the household, as in the 
perception of the care-receivers. ey invade the intimacy of the home as a physical 
space with their own spaces, introducing their signalizing, diagnostic, and monitoring 
(recently also e-Health) techniques.
16 Milligan, No Place like Home, 23: “e boundaries of home and institution become 
increasingly porous as the private space of the home becomes transformed into a site of 
work that care recipients, formal and informal care workers inhabit.”
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relatives and neighbours) is considered an integral part of the chain of care 
in the public health care system. e elderly are kept personally responsible 
as active subjects for their own health, as long as possible. e focus is 
on prevention. e frailty of old age in neo-liberal ideology is no longer a 
matter of fate, but an individual risk.
Seen from a Foucauldian perspective, this policy can be considered rather an 
expansion of the “medical gaze” than its diminishment. It does not represent 
a return to an earlier, more “natural” phase in the evolution of human 
communities, but, on the contrary, an ultramodern political construction.17 
Christine Milligan describes this development as institutionalisation 
“without walls”. She rather therefore prefers the term extitutionalisation 
of care. “While the institution has been de-territorialised, it has not been 
dematerialized.”18
Summarizing my argument thus far, I conclude that the present emphasis 
on informal care is not a return to the ‘natural’ organization of elderly care 
as in the old days, but a next step in the political construction of care. Back 
to the neighbourhood, back to the family, back home is not a simplication 
of care, but introduces a new complex, policy driven, topology in the care 
for elderly.
is politics needs an ideology. Emphasizing the importance of care at 
home simply needs the idea that home is the best place to be. However, is 
this true? In the next section, I shall deal with that question.
3. e best place to be
e concept “home” is saturated with meanings. In the phenomenology 
of ‘dwelling’ and “home” one can distinguish between home as a concrete 
material reality, the house, and home as a symbol.19 e house is, speaking 
with Augé, a place, distinguished from an abstract, anonymous space that 
17 Simon Biggs and Jason L. Powell, “A Foucauldian Analysis of Old Age and the Power of 
Social Welfare”, Journal of Aging & Social Policy, 12, no. 2 (2001): 1–20, 4.
18 Milligan, No Place like Home, 143f., resp. 22.
19 For the following, cf. Katherine H. Leith, “Home is where the heart is…or is it? A 
phenomenological exploration of the meaning of home for older women in congregate 
housing”, Journal of Aging Studies 20, no. 4 (2006): 317–333; Lisa Groger, “A Nursing 
home can be a home”, Journal of Aging Studies, 9, no. 2 (1995): 137–153; Christine 
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is devoid of meaning.20 A house with four walls, a roof, windows and a 
door, represents the physical space that oers you shelter, protection, safety 
and security against the unpredictability of the elements and the dangers of 
the strange, outside world. Home is a safe haven. e door is as important 
as the walls: one feels at home as long as one is in control about who enters 
as a guest and who has to stay outside.
Home as a symbol however, is strongly connected with one’s identity and 
sense of self. Home is the place where you can express yourself “as you 
are”. Homecoming represents the moment when, or the place where, you are 
known and loved unconditionally. “Home is, when you knock on the door, 
they have to take you in.” (Robert Frost). Home is like paradise or heaven.
Home as a symbol has also a strong social aspect. Its meaning depends on 
with whom you live together. During the life course, there are radical social 
transitions. For children, home is where mother is, where one is nourished 
and cherished. For young parents, home is the place where you nurture 
children, and where they start their public performance. For the elderly, 
home oen represents a place of remembrance – and aer the loss of a 
partner – a place of mourning, where pictures and cherished objects refer 
to a life that lies behind. It oers them a sense of continuity and identity. 
It is the place where their bodies are nested, and where conventions and 
routines prevent that their bodies are not being hurt unnecessarily. e 
meaning of home is oen also gender-related. For males, especially those 
from earlier generations, home oen represents a motherly/female space, 
where their spouses look aer men. For women at the contrary, home 
rather refers to a place of labour and taking care of others.21
Home does not always have positive connotations. Many people may 
associate “home” with domestic violence, emotional negligence, or social 
isolation. Older men may experience their being homebound as a threat 
Milligan, “From home to ‘home’: situating emotions within the caregiving experience”, 
Environment and Planning 37, no. 12 (2005): 2105–2120.
20 A geographic space becomes a place to which we attach meaning through the signicant 
personal life experiences and social interactions we accumulate there over time. See 
above, note 10.
21 Milligan, No Place like Home, 44.
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to their masculinity.22 Four walls and a door oen symbolize loneliness. 
Alternatively, for those living in a poor neighbourhood, poverty and 
unsafety.
“Home” is a complex and variable notion. In addition, the moment 
caregivers, both informal and formal, enter the home of home dwellers, 
they change the meaning it has held until then, so that it has to be 
reconstructed and renegotiated. “I am no longer master in my own home” 
is a feeling that becomes stronger with the increase of dependency. e 
physical or digital presence of professional care means loss of control and 
privacy. First, it is the kitchen, then the living room and the toilet, nally 
the bed and bathroom that are “taken over”. e elderly body still lives at 
the same place, but it is no longer … at home. e ambivalence of this new 
situation becomes even clearer when children, family members, neighbours 
or volunteers are engaged as, and take on new roles as proto-professionals.23
erefore, the idea that home is the best place to be for the elderly is a 
misunderstanding. In the background, a 19th century ideal of the nuclear 
family with its xed gender roles and private/public dichotomy, may 
still contribute to the idealization and a romanticizing of family care. 
Nevertheless, at the least, “home” is an ambivalent notion. In extreme cases, 
home even turns into a non-place, when it stands for fear, dependency, loss, 
isolation, or even violence.24 Moving to a nursing home sometimes counts 
as a blessing.25
e longing for homecoming probably represents an indelible 
anthropological universal need. It should therefore be acknowledged and 
respected. Instead of feeding a – literarily – misplaced nostalgia, it would 
be preferable to understand homecoming as a future-oriented desire.26 
22 G. Valentine, “What it means to be a man: the body, masculinities, disability”. In Mind 
and Body Spaces: Geographies of Illness, Impairment and Disability, eds. R. Butler, H. 
Parr (London and New York: Routledge, 1999), 167–180.
23 Milligan, ere’s No Place like Home, 75.
24 Milligan, No Place like Home, 73v.
25 Cf. G.C.F. omese, “Ouderen knappen op van tehuisopname”, Geron. Tijdschri over 
ouder worden en maatschappij, 9 (2007): 21–24.
26 Aer his analysis of the metaphor ‘life as a journey’ in 20th century modern literature, 
Langdon Elsbree concludes that “home no longer exists; that at best there are temporary 
layovers in the part of the planet where one happens to be; that exile, physical and/or 
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Being strangers in exile, as a metaphoric description of its existential 
characteristic, is not an exception to the human condition, but as the 
biblical narrative testies, rather its essence. eologically, the experience 
of “home-coming” should therefore be situated in eschatology, instead of 
in the doctrine of creation.27 Paradise never lies behind, but always ahead of 
us. Together with Abraham and Moses, we are journeying to a “fatherland 
we have never seen before” (E Levinas). Old age is no exemption of this 
human condition, but rather its intensication.
4. e distribution of care responsibilities
What does this mean for the distribution of care responsibilities? Neo-
liberal policy claims, seemingly in accordance with human evolution, 
that those who live in proximity of the elderly take care of them: children, 
family members, neighbourhood. Having close, “special” relations thus 
means bearing higher responsibilities. Care responsibilities for frail and 
dependent elderly should be distributed according to the model of concentric 
circles: rst the children, then the family, then the local community, and 
nally, the federal government – only if and as far as the family fails to 
provide elementary care.28 Primary responsibility comes to those who are 
physically close. Here, I want to question this model’s apparent evidence on 
both factual and ethical grounds.
Factually:
(1) In my rst section, I indicated that the geography of care has changed. 
Care for the elderly is no longer localized at one place, but in a network of 
physical and virtual spaces. is makes a territorial distribution of care 
psychic, may be a permanent condition” (Langdon Elsbree, e Rituals of Life. Patterns 
in Narrative (Port Washington, N.Y. /London: Kennikat Press, 1982), 39f.). Cf. also Frits 
de Lange, Heilige Onrust. Een pelgrimage naar het hart van religie (Ten Have: Utrecht 
2017), 115.
27 “… the Abrahamic-Mosaic adventure is capped by the process of arrival rather than of 
return.” David James Gauthier, Martin Heidegger, Emmanuel Levinas, and the Politics 
of Dwelling, PhD Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College, 
2004, 4. [Online]. Available: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_dissertations/191/ 
[Accessed: 1 February 2018].
28 Doreen Massey, “Geographies of Responsibility”, Geograska Annaler. Series B, Human 
Geography 86, no. 1 (2004): 5–18: 10.
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responsibilities obsolete. In an electronic and digital society, proximity is 
organized in a symbolic world, and no longer just physical. When it comes 
to care or assistance, your next-door neighbour can turn into a stranger, 
and your Facebook contacts into close friends.
(2) e birth rate in highly industrialized countries has decreased to 2.4 
and the number of one-person households is increasing. In emerging 
economies, the same demographic and sociological processes are taking 
place, as the standard of living rises. ough the speed of ageing of the 
population on the southern hemisphere – is slower than in the North, the 
so-called dependency rate is also increasing on the African continent.29 
“Ought implies can” is a well-known ethical rule. Morally one cannot 
require what factually cannot be done. In the case of elderly care: If there 
are no children, no moral appeal can be made to them.
(3) High life expectancy combined with revolutionary developments in 
medical technology, make elderly care more complex than ever before. 
Both health care prevention (nutrition, exercise, medical check-ups) and 
specialized geriatric care become embedded in technical expert systems 
that are organized virtually and no longer territorially. Informal care is a 
visible, but only a limited part of today’s health care system.
29 “Fertility decline began more recently in Africa than in the other regions, and thus 
the proportion of children is starting to fall and the share of working-age persons is 
beginning to increase, while the proportion of older persons in the population remains 
fairly small. As a result, the total dependency ratio in Africa is falling gradually, and 
that decline is projected to continue into the second half of the twenty-rst century. e 
dependency ratio in Africa fell from its peak of 140 dependents per 100 working-age 
persons in the mid-1980s to 121 dependents per 100 working-age persons in 2015, and 
is projected to continue to decline to 91 dependents per 100 working-age persons in 
2050.”
e dependency ratio measures the portion of a population which is composed of 
dependents (people who are too young or too old to work) and is equal to the number 
of individuals aged below 15 or above 64 divided by the number of individuals aged 
15 to 64, expressed as a percentage. (World Population Ageing 2015, United Nations, 
New York, 2015, p. 35. [Online]. Available: http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/
publications/pdf/ageing/WPA2015_Report.pdf [Accessed: 1 February 2018].
“is process of rapid aging in emerging countries can be described as the ‘paradox 
of development’: people live longer, but run a greater risk of falling into old age poverty 
because family support is declining and this is not being replaced with social security 
measures at the same rate.’ (Caroline E. van Dullemen, e Politics of Aging. e Risk 
of Old Age Poverty in Emerging Countries, PhD VU Amsterdam 2017, 2, [Online]. 
Available: http://dare.ubvu.vu.nl/handle/1871/55259 [Accessed: 1 February 2018].
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Consequently, these facts require an ethical reection on the distribution 
of moral responsibilities in the care for the elderly. Let me rst clarify 
my understanding of morality and responsibility. In modern ethics, a 
theoretical-juridical conception of morality still dominates. e essence 
of morality is regarded as a form of knowledge that can be reconstructed 
theoretically. Margaret Urban Walker proposes an alternative, expressive-
collaborative vision. In the rst model, morality is seen as a kind of code, 
which orients individuals in their agency. Responsibility can then be 
expressed accordingly in formulas and applied in rules and procedures. For 
example: moral theory entails that someone is responsible for a situation 
deliberately created by him or her, consciously and voluntarily. If none or 
only one or two of these criteria do apply, a moral subject cannot be held 
(fully) responsible. e expressive-collaborative approach, however, regards 
morality not as a form of knowledge, but as a whole of practices within a 
certain community which functions as “a socially embodied medium of 
understanding and adjustment in which people account to each other for 
the identities, relationships, and values that dene their responsibilities.”30 
e sources of morality can be diverse: certain vocabularies or grammars 
(words like “irresponsible”, “good”, “wrong”, “promise”, “lie” etc.) but also 
broadly accepted judgments (conventions) or the conduct of exemplary 
persons can function alike. Moral adjustment happens by arguments, 
but also by emotions or gestures. Decision-making can occur in freedom, 
but also through conicts or as dictated by external authority. Morality, 
understood as a social and cultural practice, is not only agency-oriented 
(what should I do?) but also expresses identities (this is me or us) and values 
(this is what I/we nd important). In this approach, morality functions as 
a distributive code in the allocation of responsibilities, to be negotiated 
repeatedly.31 It is characteristic for ethical practice in democratic societies 
to strive for dialogical, reasoned, non-violent and just negotiations.
30 “[T]he expressive-collaborative conception pictures morality as a socially embodied 
medium of understanding and adjustment in which people account to each other for 
the identities, relationships, and values that dene their responsibilities’ (Walker, 
Moral Understandings, 63)
31 ‘e materials for assigning responsibilities are given, but exactly how to go on with 
them, how to make them work in particular cases, and where and how to extend or 
modify them, may not be’ (Walker, Moral Understandings, 62).
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is understanding of morality as a dynamic cultural practice safeguards 
us from the so-called naturalistic fallacy in the allocation of responsibilities. 
Even when it may be factually true in the history of humankind that adult 
children were always responsible for taking care for their frail parents, this 
does not imply that they are obliged to continue this way, only for the reason 
that it has been “natural” to do so. Who is responsible for what and when 
towards whom, is a matter of mutual assessment of all the stakeholders in 
a particular community. It is the task of ethics to supervise and set rules 
for a fair negotiation process, without being able to call in some decisive 
knowledge, or an external authority. Ethical knowledge is not knowledge 
of principles, which lie ready to be discovered in the moral domain, but of 
fairness within a cultural practice.
With the so-called “ethics of care” I assume that care is the most fundamental 
cultural practice, and that the allocation of care responsibilities therein (who 
takes care of whom and where?) is a political aair throughout.32 In neo-
liberal societies, the responsibility for specialized medical care is located 
in mixed public-private arrangements, accessible to those who participate 
in the social assurance system (in countries with a public health service 
like the UK, France or the Netherlands) or only for those who can aord 
it nancially (like in the US). Care, in either way, is something you can 
buy if you are entitled to it. Informal care however, is considered a private 
responsibility, in practice mostly delegated to women. As the number of 
elderly with chronic ailments is increasing, this political, ideologically 
inspired division between informal/private and formal/public care is 
reaching its practical limits. ere is simply more need for informal care 
than can be delivered privately. Families are expected to behave like proto-
professionals. Oen, the informal care workers who are available, collapse 
under their burden.
Summarizing: Both on factual and moral grounds, I think that the concentric 
model of the distribution of responsibilities should be reconsidered. It is 
taken for granted that the geography of responsibilities assumes that care 
responsibility increases, the closer one lives to the one in need of care. 
Proximity is the criterion, understood both physically and aectively. Both 
32 “e central question for an ethics of care is: How can I (we) best meet my (our) caring 
responsibilities?” (Tronto, Moral Boundaries, 137).
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connotations are connected. Our family, children, parents etc. are “close” to 
us because we are or were living close to them. is makes our relationship to 
them special. In addition, special relationships generate special obligations.
e biblical parable of the Good Samaritan (Luke 10:30–37) breaks with the 
apparently obvious nexus between aectivity and territory. e Samaritan 
is an outcast and outsider, a stranger who decides to come physically close 
to the victim in the ditch, as the priest and the Levite, aectively close 
to the parable’s audience, are taking distance by passing by. However, at 
the same time, the narrative still seems to emphasize physical proximity 
as the source of responsibility. e person who nds him- or herself in 
the neighbourhood of someone in need, is obliged to assist, simply for 
that reason, as the parable seems to suggest. One enters into a ‘special 
relationship’ with a stranger, the moment he or she comes closer physically.
However, is it really proximity – either spatial, emotional or both – that 
makes the Samaritan responsible? Philosopher Robert E. Goodin defends 
another position. Against a Kantian-inspired ethics, which entails that the 
moral law forbids having special relationships, he also upholds that there 
are indeed “special relationships” with “special responsibilities”. Some 
people are morally closer to us than others are. Goodin’s claim, however, 
is that the special responsibility we have for them is not based on their 
physical and/or emotional proximity but consists in their vulnerability 
for specically our agency. “Special responsibilities derive from the fact 
that other people are dependent on you and are particularly vulnerable to 
your actions and choices.”33 is vulnerability might be caused by the fact 
that you are, by coincidence, on the spot, and you fortuitously are exactly 
disposing over the right means to be of help (a lifeboat or lifejacket for a 
drowning person). However, Goodin’s argument also counts for situations 
where there is no physical or emotional proximity. e only thing that 
matters is that you, only you and no one else, can help. It is not the proximity, 
but the dependency that is decisive.
33 Robert E. Goodin, Protecting the Vulnerable. A Reanalysis of Our Social Responsibilities 
(Chicago and London: e University of Chicago Press, 1985), 33. Compare his formula 
on p. 118: “If A’s interest are vulnerable to B’s actions and choices, B has a special 
responsibility to protect A’s interests; the strength of this responsibility depends strictly 
upon the degree to which B can aect A’s interests.”
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e responsibility in long-term relationships between frail parents and 
adult children – people with a common history, which created dependencies 
for specic needs – becomes understandable this way: though there exists 
closeness to each other, responsibility here is not based on proximity, but 
on specic vulnerability. Parents depend on the emotional support of their 
children, especially when their identities are threatened or damaged by the 
diculties of old age. Children conrm and support their parent’s narrative 
identity through physical and aective intimacy, storytelling, by visiting 
meaningful places together etc.34 the care provided this way, not only 
expresses but also serves to underscore the relationship between parents 
and children. In sight of death, every role and status seems transient, except 
the indelibility of parenthood.35
What counts between parents and children here is a particular vulnerability 
and a specic dependency. Other kinds of assistance (nancial, 
administrative, technical, and para-medical) should be provided by those 
who are specically accountable for these needs, because they, and only 
they, have the expertise required to be of help. So not only for family and 
close community members, but also even for care professionals it applies: 
“We are all special in some respects”.36
In conclusion: vulnerabilities and dependencies are not natural givens. 
ey are social constructions, which can change according to time and 
culture.37 In new social practices in the changing landscape of care, 
care responsibilities must constantly be re-negotiated, and traditional 
expectations may be challenged on good grounds. e neo-liberal claim 
that for the elderly home is the best place to be, and that their children 
have the primary responsibility for taking care of them, is a claim to be 
contested. Who should care for whom, when and where? e question 
should be answered in a democratic public dialogue between all those 
involved, and should not be passed on to individual families or neighbours. 
34 Cf. Goodin, Protecting the Vulnerable, 83–89.
35 Walker, Moral Understandings, 91.
36 Walker, Moral Understandings, 99.
37 “Rights and responsibilities in relation to the care of older people operate across a 
spectrum; with care being located rmly within the family and home at one end of the 
spectrum, and within the state and institutional settings at the other” (Milligan, No 
Place like Home, 58).
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In societies that consider the care for children (education, child protection, 
youth care) as a public responsibility, elderly care should also be considered 
a public good, for which we bear a collective responsibility.
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